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March 14, 2007 
 
As delegates gathered in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 for the Constitutional 
Convention, among the questions they faced was whether the young United States should 
have an autonomous, independent seat of government. Just four years prior, in 1783, a 
mutiny of disbanded soldiers had gathered and threatened Congressional delegates when 
they met in Philadelphia.  
 
Congress called upon the government of Pennsylvania for protection; when refused, it 
was forced to adjourn and reconvene in New Jersey. The incident underscored the view 
that "the federal government be independent of the states, and that no one state be given 
more than an equal share of influence over it..." According to James Madison, without a 
permanent national capital, not only the public authority might be insulted and its 
proceedings be interrupted, with impunity; but a dependence of the members of the 
general Government, on the State comprehending the seat of the Government for 
protection in the exercise of their duty might bring on the national councils an imputation 
of awe or influence, equally dishonorable to the Government and dissatisfactory to the 
other members of the confederacy. 
 
The Constitution thus authorized the creation of an autonomous, permanent District to 
serve as the seat of the federal government. This clause was effectuated in 1790, when 
Congress accepted land that Maryland and Virginia ceded to the United States to create 
the national capital. Ten years later, on the first Monday of December 1800, jurisdiction 
over the District of Columbia (the "District") was vested in the federal government. Since 
then, District residents have not had a right to vote for Members of Congress. 
 
The District of Columbia House Voting Rights Act of 2007, H.R. 1433, (the "Act"), 
would grant District residents Congressional representation by providing that the District 
be considered a Congressional district in the House of Representatives, beginning with 
the 110th Congress. To accommodate the new representative from the District, 
membership in the House would be permanently increased by two members. One newly 
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created seat would go to the representative from the District, and the other would be 
assigned to the State next eligible for a Congressional district. 
 
Congress has ample constitutional authority to enact the District of Columbia House 
Voting Rights Act of 2007. The District Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I, 8, cl. 17, empowers 
Congress to "exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District" 
and thus grants Congress plenary and exclusive authority to legislate all matters 
concerning the District. This broad legislative authority extends to the granting of 
Congressional voting rights for District residents as illustrated by the text, history and 
structure of the Constitution as well as judicial decisions and pronouncements in 
analogous or related contexts. Article I, section 2, prescribing that the House be 
composed of members chosen "by the People of the several States," does not speak to 
Congressional authority under the District Clause to afford the District certain rights and 
status appurtenant to states. Indeed, the courts have consistently validated legislation 
treating the District as a state, even for constitutional purposes. Most notably, the 
Supreme Court affirmed Congressional power to grant District residents access to federal 
courts through diversity jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the Constitution grants such 
jurisdiction only "to all Cases . . . between Citizens of different States." Likewise, cases 
like Adams v. Clinton, 90 F. Supp. 2d 35, 50 n.25 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 531 U.S. 940 (2000), 
holding that District residents do not have a judicially enforceable constitutional right to 
Congressional representation, do not deny (but rather, in some instances, affirm) 
Congressional authority under the District Clause to grant such voting rights. I. Congress 
Has the Authority under the District Clause to Provide the District of Columbia with 
Representation in the House of Representatives. 
 
The District Clause provides Congress with ample authority to give citizens of the 
District representation in the House of Representatives. That Clause provides Congress 
with extraordinary and plenary power to legislate with respect to the District. This 
authority was recognized at the time of the Founding, when (before formal creation of the 
national capital in 1800) Congress exercised its authority to permit citizens of the District 
to vote in Maryland and Virginia elections. 
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A. The Constitution Grants Congress the Broadest Possible Legislative Authority Over 
the District of Columbia. 
 
The District of Columbia as the national seat of the federal government is explicitly 
created by Article I, 8, clause 17 (the "District Clause"). This provision authorizes 
Congress [t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District 
(not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the 
Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States... 
 
This clause, which has been described as "majestic in its scope," gives Congress plenary 
and exclusive power to legislate for the District. Courts have held that the District Clause 
is "sweeping and inclusive in character" and gives Congress "extraordinary and plenary 
power" over the District. It allows Congress to legislate within the District for "every 
proper purpose of government." Congress therefore possesses "full and unlimited 
jurisdiction to provide for the general welfare of citizens within the District of Columbia 
by any and every act of legislation which it may deem conducive to that end," subject, of 
course, to the negative prohibitions of the Constitution. 
 
To appreciate the full breadth of Congress' plenary power under the District Clause, one 
need only recognize that the Clause works an exception to the constitutional structure of 
"our Federalism," which delineates and delimits the legislative power of Congress and 
state legislatures. In joining the Union, the states gave up certain of their powers. Most 
explicitly, Article II, section 10 specifies activities which are prohibited to the States. 
None of these prohibitions apply to Congress when it exercises its authority under the 
District Clause. Conversely, Congress is limited to legislative powers enumerated in the 
Constitution; such limited enumeration, coupled with the reservation under the Tenth 
Amendment, serves to check the power of Congress vis-a-vis the states. The District 
Clause contains no such counterbalancing restraints because its authorization of 
"exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever" explicitly recognizes that there is no 
competing state sovereign authority. Thus, when Congress acts pursuant to the District 
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Clause, it acts as a legislature of national character, exercising "complete legislative 
control as contrasted with the limited power of a state legislature, on the one hand, and as 
contrasted with the limited sovereignty which Congress exercises within the boundaries 
of the states, on the other." In few, if any, other areas does the Constitution grant any 
broader authority to Congress to legislate. 
 
B. Evidence at the Founding Confirms that Congress' Extraordinary and Plenary 
Authority under the District Clause Extends to Granting Congressional Representation to 
the District. There are no indications, textual or otherwise, to suggest that the Framers 
intended that Congressional authority under the District Clause, extraordinary and 
plenary in all other respects, would not extend also to grant District residents 
representation in Congress. The delegates to the Constitutional Convention discussed and 
adopted the Constitution without any recorded debates on voting, representation, or other 
rights of the inhabitants of the yet-to- be-selected seat of government. The purpose for 
establishing a federal district was to ensure that the national capital would not be subject 
to the influences of any state. Denying the residents of the District the right to vote in 
elections for the House of Representatives was neither necessary nor intended by the 
Framers to achieve this purpose. 
 
Indeed, so long as the exact location of the seat of government was undecided, 
representation for the District's residents seemed unimportant. It was assumed that the 
states donating the land for the District would make appropriate provisions in their acts of 
cession for the rights of the residents of the ceded land. As a delegate to the North 
Carolina ratification debate noted, Wherever they may have this district, they must 
possess it from the authority of the state within which it lies; and that state may stipulate 
the conditions of the cession. Will not such state take care of the liberties of its own 
people? James Madison also felt that "there must be a cession, by particular states, of the 
district to Congress, and that the states may settle the terms of the cession. The states may 
make what stipulation they please in it, and, if they apprehend any danger, they may 
refuse it altogether." The terms of the cession and acceptance illustrate that, in effect, 
Congress exercised its authority under the District Clause to grant District residents 
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voting rights coterminous with those of the ceding states when it accepted the land in 
1790. Maryland ceded land to the United States in 1788. Virginia did so in 1789. The 
cessions of land by Maryland and Virginia were accepted by Act of Congress in 1790. 
This Act also established the first Monday in December 1800 as the official date of 
federal assumption of control over the District. Because of the lag between the time of 
cession by Maryland and Virginia and the actual creation of the District by the federal 
government, assertion of exclusive federal jurisdiction over the area was postponed for a 
decade. During that time, District residents voted in Congressional elections in their 
respective ceding state. 
 
In 1800, when the United States formally assumed full control of the District, Congress 
by omission withdrew the grant of voting rights to District residents. The legislatures of 
both Maryland and Virginia provided that their respective laws would continue in force 
in the territories they had ceded until Congress both accepted the cessions and provided 
for the government of the District. Congress, in turn, explicitly acknowledged by act that 
the "operation of the laws" of Maryland and Virginia would continue until the acceptance 
of the District by the federal government and the time when Congress would "otherwise 
by law provide." The laws of Maryland and Virginia thus remained in force for the next 
decade and District residents continued to be represented by and vote for Maryland and 
Virginia congressmen during this period. The critical point here is that during the relevant 
period of 1790-1800, District residents were able to vote in Congressional elections in 
Maryland and Virginia not because they were citizens of those states the cession had 
ended their political link with those states. Rather, their voting rights derived from 
Congressional action under the District Clause recognizing and ratifying the ceding 
states' law as the applicable law for the now-federal territory until further legislation. It 
was therefore not the cessions themselves, but the federal assumption of authority in 
1800, that deprived District residents of representation in Congress. The actions of this 
first Congress, authorizing District residents to vote in Congressional elections of the 
ceding states, thus demonstrate the Framers' belief that Congress may authorize by statute 
representation for the District. 
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II. Article I, Section 2, Clause 1 Does Not Speak to Congressional Authority to Grant 
Representation to the District. 
 
The District is not a state for purposes of Congress' Article I, section 2, clause 1, which 
provides that members of the House are chosen "by the people of the several States." This 
fact, however, says nothing about Congress' authority under the District Clause to give 
residents of the District the same rights as citizens of a state. As early as 1805 the 
Supreme Court recognized that Congress had authority to treat the District like a state, 
and Congress has repeatedly exercised this authority. This long-standing precedent 
demonstrates the breadth of Congress' power under the District Clause. C. Congress May 
Exercise Its Authority Under the District Clause to Grant District Residents Certain 
Rights and Status Appurtenant to Citizenship of a State, Including Congressional 
Representation. 
 
Article I, 2, clause 1 of the Constitution provides for the election of members of the 
House of Representatives. It states: 
 
The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year 
by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the 
Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State 
Legislature. [emphasis added]. Although the District is not a state in the same manner as 
the fifty constituent geographical bodies that comprise the United States, the failure of 
this clause to mention citizens of the District does not preclude Congress from legislating 
to provide representation in the House. 
 
Case law dating from the early days of the Republic demonstrates that Congressional 
legislation is the appropriate mechanism for granting national representation to District 
residents. In Hepburn v. Ellzey, residents of the District attempted to file suit in the 
Circuit Court of Virginia based on diversity jurisdiction. However, under Article III, 
section 2, of the Constitution, diversity jurisdiction only exists "between citizens of 
different States." Plaintiffs argued that the District was a state for purposes of Article III's 
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Diversity Clause. Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, held that "members of the 
American confederacy" are the only "states" contemplated in the Constitution. Provisions 
such as Article I, section 2, use the word "state" as designating a member of the Union, 
the Court observed, and the same meaning must therefore apply to provisions relating to 
the judiciary. Thus, the Court held that the District was not a state for purposes of 
diversity jurisdiction under Article III. However, even though the Court held that the term 
"state" as used in Article III did not include the District, Chief Justice Marshall 
acknowledged that "it is extraordinary that the courts of the United States, which are open 
to aliens, and to the citizens of every state in the union, should be closed upon [District 
citizens]." But, he explained, "this is a subject for legislative, not for judicial 
consideration." Chief Justice Marshall thereby laid out the blueprint by which Congress, 
rather than the courts, could treat the District as a state under the Constitution. 
 
Over the many years since Hepburn, Congress heeded Chief Justice Marshall's advice 
and enacted legislation granting District residents access to federal courts on diversity 
grounds. In 1940, Congress enacted a statute bestowing jurisdiction on federal courts in 
actions "between citizens of different States, or citizens of the District of Columbia . . . 
and any State or Territory." This statute was challenged in National Mutual Insurance Co. 
of the District of Columbia v. Tidewater Transfer Co. Relying on Hepburn as well as 
Congress' power under the District Clause, the Court upheld the statute. Justice Jackson, 
writing for a plurality of the Court, declined to overrule the conclusion in Hepburn that 
the District is not a "state" under the Constitution. Relying on Marshall's statement that 
"the matter is a subject for 'legislative not for judicial consideration,"' however, the 
plurality held that the conclusion that the District was not a "state" as the term is used in 
Article III did not deny Congress the power under other provisions of the Constitution to 
treat the District as a state for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. 
 
Specifically, the plurality noted that the District Clause authorizes Congress "to exercise 
exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District," and concluded that 
Chief Justice Marshall was referring to this provision when he stated in Hepburn that the 
matter was more appropriate for legislative attention. The responsibility of Congress for 
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the welfare of District residents includes the power and duty to provide those residents 
with courts adequate to adjudicate their claims against, as well as suits brought by, 
citizens of the several states. Therefore, according to the plurality, Congress can utilize its 
power under the District Clause to impose "the judicial function of adjudicating 
justiciable controversies on the regular federal courts..." The statute, it held, was 
constitutional. Justice Rutledge, concurring in the judgment, would have overruled 
Hepburn outright and held that the District constituted a "state" under the Diversity 
Clause. 
 
The significance of Tidewater is that the five justices concurring in the result believed 
either that the District was a state under the terms of the Constitution or that the District 
Clause authorized Congress to enact legislation treating the District as a state. The 
decision did not overrule Hepburn, but it effectively rejected the view that "state" has a 
"single, unvarying constitutional meaning which excludes the District." Although both 
Article I, section 2, and Article III, section 2, refer to "States" and by their terms do not 
include the District, Tidewater makes clear that this limitation does not vitiate 
Congressional authority to treat the District like a state for purposes of federal legislation, 
including legislation governing election of members to the House. 
 
Adams v. Clinton is not to the contrary. Rather, the decision reinforces Chief Justice 
Marshall's pronouncement that Congress, and not the courts, has authority to grant 
District residents certain rights and status appurtenant to state citizenship under the 
Constitution. In Adams, District residents argued that they have a constitutional right to 
elect representatives to Congress. A three-judge district court, construing the 
constitutional text and history, determined that the District is not a state under Article I, 
section 2, and therefore the plaintiffs do not have a judicially cognizable right to 
Congressional representation. In so doing, the court noted specifically that it "lack[ed] 
authority to grant plaintiffs the relief they seek," and thus District residents "must plead 
their cause in other venues." Just as Chief Justice Marshall in Hepburn and Justice 
Jackson in Tidewater recognized that the District Clause protected the plenary and 
exclusive authority of Congress to traverse where the judiciary cannot tread, so too the 
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court in Adams v. Clinton suggested that it is up to Congress to grant through legislation 
the fairness in representation that the court was unable to order by fiat. 
 
Tidewater is simply the most influential of many cases in which courts have upheld the 
right of Congress to treat the District as a state under the Constitution pursuant to its 
broad authority under the District Clause. From the birth of the Republic, courts have 
repeatedly affirmed treatment of the District a "state" for a wide variety of statutory, 
treaty, and even constitutional purposes. In deciding whether the District constitutes a 
"state" under a particular statute, courts examine "the character and aim of the specific 
provision involved." In Milton S. Kronheim & Co. Inc. v. District of Columbia, Congress 
treated the District as a state for purposes of alcohol regulation under the Alcoholic 
Beverage Control Act. The District of Columbia Circuit held that such a designation was 
valid and it had "no warrant to interfere with Congress' plenary power under the District 
Clause '[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over [the] District."' 
In Palmore v. United States, the Court recognized and accepted that 28 U.S.C. 1257, 
which provides for Supreme Court review of the final judgments of the highest court of a 
state, had been amended by Congress in 1970 to include the District of Columbia Court 
of Appeals within the term "highest court of a State." The federal district court in the 
District found that Congress could treat the District as a state, and thus provide it with 
11th Amendment immunity, when creating an interstate agency, as it did when it treated 
the District as a state under the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority. Even 
District of Columbia v. Carter, which found that the District was not a state for purposes 
of 42 U.S.C. 1983, helps illustrate this fundamental point. In the aftermath of the Carter 
decision, Congress passed an amendment treating the District as a state under section 
1983, and this enactment has never successfully been challenged. Numerous other 
examples abound of statutes that treat the District like a state. 
 
The District may also be considered a state pursuant to an international treaty. In de 
Geofroy v. Riggs, a treaty between the United States and France provided that: In all 
states of the Union whose existing laws permit it, so long and to the same extent as the 
said laws shall remain in force, Frenchmen shall enjoy the right of possessing personal 
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and real property by the same title, and in the same manner, as the citizens of the United 
States. 
 
The Supreme Court concluded that "states of the Union" meant "all the political 
communities exercising legislative powers in the country, embracing, not only those 
political communities which constitute the United States, but also those communities 
which constitute the political bodies known as 'territories' and the 'District of Columbia."' 
Courts have even found the District to constitute a state under other provisions of the 
Constitution. The Supreme Court has held that the Commerce Clause authorizes 
Congress to regulate commerce across the District's borders, even though that Clause 
only refers to commerce "among the several States." Similarly, the Court has interpreted 
Article I, section 2, clause 3, which provides that "Representatives and direct Taxes shall 
be apportioned among the several States ... according to their respective Numbers," as 
applying to the District. The Court also found that the Sixth Amendment right to trial by 
jury extends to the people of the District, even though the text of the Amendment states 
"in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, 
by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed..." And the District of Columbia Circuit held that the District is a state under 
the Twenty-First Amendment, which prohibits "[t]he transportation or importation into 
any state, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of 
intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof..." If the District can be treated as a 
"state" under the Constitution for these and other purposes, it follows that Congress can 
legislate to treat the District as a state for purposes of Article I representation. 
 
D. Other Legislation Has Allowed Citizens Who Are Not Residents of States to Vote in 
National Elections. A frequent argument advanced by opponents of District 
representation is that Article I explicitly ties voting for members of the House of 
Representatives to citizenship in a state. This argument is wrong. 
 
The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act allows otherwise 
disenfranchised American citizens residing in foreign countries while retaining their 
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American citizenship to vote by absentee ballot in "the last place in which the person was 
domiciled before leaving the United States." The overseas voter need not be a citizen of 
the state where voting occurs. Indeed, the voter need not have an abode in that state, pay 
taxes in that state, or even intend to return to that state. Thus, the Act permits voting in 
federal elections by persons who are not citizens of any state. Moreover, these overseas 
voters are not qualified to vote in national elections under the literal terms of Article I; 
because they are no longer citizens of a state, they do not have "the Qualifications 
requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature." If there is 
no constitutional bar prohibiting Congress from permitting overseas voters who are not 
citizens of a state to vote in federal elections, there is no constitutional bar to similar 
legislation extending the federal franchise to District residents. Justice Kennedy's 
concurring opinion in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton provides further evidence that 
the right to vote in federal elections is not necessarily tied to state citizenship. In his 
opinion, Justice Kennedy wrote that the right to vote in federal elections "do[es] not 
derive from the state power in the first instance but...belong[s] to the voter in his or her 
capacity as a citizen of the United States. . ." Indeed, when citizens vote in national 
elections, they exercise "a federal right of citizenship, a relationship between the people 
of the Nation and their National Government, with which the States may not interfere." 
 
Needless to say, the right to vote is one of the most important of the fundamental 
principles of democracy: 
 
No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of 
those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even 
the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined. Our Constitution leaves no 
room for classification of people in a way that unnecessarily abridges this right. 
 
The right to vote is regarded as "a fundamental political right, because preservative of all 
rights." Such a right "is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on 
that right strike at the heart of representative government." Given these considerations, 
depriving Congress of the right to grant the District Congressional representation 
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pursuant to the District Clause thwarts the very purposes on which the Constitution is 
based. Allowing Congress to exercise such a power under the authority granted to it by 
the District Clause would remove a political disability with no constitutional rationale, 
give the District, which is akin to a state in virtually all important respects, its 
proportionate influence in national affairs, and correct the historical accident by which 
District residents have been denied the right to vote in national elections. 
 
III. The Twenty-Third Amendment Does Not Affect Congressional Authority to Grant 
Representation to the District. 
 
Although District residents currently may not vote for representatives or senators, the 
23rd Amendment to the Constitution provides them the right to cast a vote in presidential 
elections. The 23rd Amendment, ratified in 1961, provides: The District constituting the 
seat of Government of the United States shall appoint in such manner as the Congress 
may direct: A number of electors of President and Vice President equal to the whole 
number of Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the District would be 
entitled if it were a State, but in no event more than the least populous State;... but they 
shall be considered, for the purposes of the election of President and Vice President, to be 
electors appointed by a State... 
 
Opponents of District representation argue that the enactment of the Amendment 
demonstrates that any provision for District representation must be made by 
constitutional amendment and not by simple legislation. The existence of the 23rd 
Amendment, dealing with presidential elections under Article II, has little relevance to 
Congress' power to provide the District with Congressional representation under the 
District Clause of Article I. Not only does the Constitution grant Congress broad and 
plenary powers to legislate for the District by such clause, it provides Congress with 
sweeping authority "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying 
into Execution" its Article I powers. The 23rd Amendment, however, concerns the 
District's ability to appoint presidential electors to the Electoral College, an entity 
established by Article II of the Constitution. 
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Congressional authority under Article II is very circumscribed indeed, limited to its 
authority under Article II, 1, clause 4, to determine the day on which the Electoral 
College votes. Because legislating with respect to the Electoral College is outside 
Congress' Article I authority, Congress could not by statute grant District residents a vote 
for President; granting District residents the right to vote in presidential elections of 
necessity had to be achieved via constitutional amendment. By contrast, providing the 
District with representation in Congress implicates Article I concerns and Congress is 
authorized to enact such legislation by the District Clause. Therefore, no constitutional 
amendment is needed, and the existence of the 23rd Amendment does not imply 
otherwise. 
 
Although this opinion is limited to analyzing the legal basis of Congressional authority to 
enact the District of Columbia House Voting Rights Act of 2007 and does not venture a 
view on its policy merits, it is at least ironic that residents of the Nation's capital continue 
to be denied the right to select a representative to the "People's House." 
 
My conclusion that Congress has the authority to grant Congressional representation to 
the District is motivated in part by the principle, firmly imbedded in our constitutional 
tradition, that "[n]o right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in 
the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live." 
